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Abstract 
The Java SSL/TLS package distributed with the J2SE 1.4.2 runtime is a Java 
implementation of the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocols.  Java-based web services and other 
systems deployed by the DoD will depend on this implementation to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.  Security and performance assessment of 
this implementation is critical given the proliferation of web services within DoD 
channels.  This research assessed the performance of the J2SE 1.4.2 SSL and TLS 
implementations, paying particular attention to identifying performance limitations given 
a very secure configuration.   
The performance metrics of this research were CPU utilization, network bandwidth, 
memory, and maximum number of secure socket that could be created given various 
factors.  This research determined an integral performance relationship between the 
memory heap size and the encryption algorithm used.   By changing the default heap size 
setting of the Java Virtual Machine from 64 MB to 256 MB and using the symmetric 
encryption algorithm of AES256, a high performance, highly secure SSL configuration is 
achievable.  This configuration can support over 2000 simultaneous secure sockets with 
various encrypted data sizes.  This yields a 200 percent increase in performance over the 
default configuration, while providing the additional security of 256-bit symmetric key 
encryption to the application data. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY OF J2SDK 1.4 JSSE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SSL/TLS  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Java SSL/TLS package distributed with the J2SE 1.4.2 runtime is a Java 
implementation of the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocols.  Java-based web services and other 
systems deployed by the DoD will depend on this implementation to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.  Security and performance assessment of 
this implementation is critical given the proliferation of web services within DoD 
channels. This thesis is organized into five distinct chapters; introduction, background, 
methodology, results and analysis, and the conclusion. 
The background chapter sets up the research effort by giving detailed background on 
Java and how it has evolved to become a secure architecture.  The Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol is also explained since JSSE is just an implementation of this well 
documented standard.  The handshake and record protocol within SSL is mapped to show 
how the SSL process of encryption actually works.  Specifics of how JSSE implements 
SSL are given and a mapping is shown of all the Java classes used in the implementation.  
Security concerns of any SSL implementation include: 
• Malformed SSL communications which could cause incorrect ciphers to be 
used 
• Timing and cryptographic attacks on SSL  
• Padding attacks 
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• Denial of Service and resource exhaustion  
Chapter Three, the methodology chapter starts with the statement of the problem the 
research is addressing as well as detailing the four goals of the research and the 
hypotheses.  After the goals are defined, the boundaries of the system are laid out and 
defined.  The services provided by the system are documented and performance metrics 
are identified.  Parameters are identified and their static values are determined.  The 
workload to be used in the simulation program is defined and explained as are the factors 
that will determine how many experiments are going to be necessary to test the system.  
The evaluation technique is explained along with code segments used in the development 
of the simulation program.  Specific attention is focused on how the factors and 
parameters are implemented.  The chapter concludes with an explanation and details of 
the experimental design. 
Chapter Four focuses on the analysis and results of the experimentation.  The raw 
data obtained from the simulation scenarios are presented as well as the statistical 
techniques used to analyze the data.  The raw data considered vital to the presentation 
were appended to the paper as Appendices A and B.  The analysis of the data is explained 
and the answers are matched to the investigative questions of the research effort. 
The final chapter discusses the conclusions of the research and the significance of 
the effort.  Based upon the conclusions reached from the study, recommendations for 
action are detailed for setting up a JSSE implementation.  Since this research was unable 
to touch all associated areas, there are also recommendations for future research in this 
area. 
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2.  Background 
This chapter provides background information on the research topic.  In it, the 
history of security in Java is discussed as well as the basics of the Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol.  These are intended to explain why SSL was incorporated into Java via 
the Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE). 
2.1 Introduction 
The next two sections explain the current Java Security Architecture and the JSSE 
implementation of SSL.  These sections provide information and sources on how SSL 
was implemented into Java. 
The final parts of the chapter provide background information on certain attacks to 
which the Java implementation of SSL may be susceptible.  Denials of Service and 
resource exhaustion possibilities are included.  Information on the tools of the research 
effort and a summary concludes the chapter. 
2.2 History of Security in Java 
2.2.1 Mobile Code 
The big advantage of Java is its portability.  Through the use of Java applets, 
developers are able to create code that can be downloaded directly into a Web browser.  
This technology is one of the first that turned the Web browser into a framework that 
could support the execution of applications downloaded over the Web [Pec00].  This 
creates a new paradigm for computing, which is in stark contrast to traditional desktop 
computing. 
 
18 
With traditional desktop computing, applications are loaded and executed by the user 
on a local machine.  Whenever updates to application software are needed, updates are 
obtained from sources such as CD, removable disks, and tapes.  The updates are then 
manually loaded.  Java applets are a new paradigm in which mobile code is downloaded 
dynamically to a local Web browser and automatically updated whenever a revisit to the 
Web site from where the code was downloaded is made [McG02]. 
This grand vision is somewhat tempered by the fact that network data rates are not 
where they need to be for large updates [Pec00].  This limits the realistic size of the Java 
applets and therefore limits the complexity of the applications downloaded.  Another 
limiting factor is the performance of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) implementations 
equipped with Web browsers. 
Despite the problems associated with mobile code provided by Java applets, Sun 
Microsystems did realize there would be some implementation of these applets.  They 
further understood that for applets to be viable for business and government use, they 
would need security designed in at an early stage.  It is believed that most users want to 
limit access to their local machines when downloading software from remote Web sites.  
Many traditional desktop applications require access to the local file system, but with 
increased security risks due to malicious software, this access needs to be limited.  Java 
security developers have tried to keep pace with what seems to be critical at a given time.  
Java security has gone through several different iterations to keep pace with the current 
Web security environment [Pec00]. 
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2.2.2 Java 1.0 Sandbox Security Model 
The Java security model has evolved with each major Java version release.  Java 
version 1.0 platform provided a very limited security model known as the “sandbox” 
model.  In the sandbox model, only local code had access to all the resources (files, new 
network connections, etc.,) that were exposed and accessed by the JVM.  Code 
downloaded from remote sources such as applets only had access to a limited number of 
resources.  Thus, file-system access and the capability to create new connections were 
limited for remote code.  This was a major concern for JVM implementations equipped 
with Web browsers. 
The Java 1.0 security model was too restrictive and did not allow much flexibility 
for Java developers.  The ability to provide downloadable applications over the Web was 
being stifled by the fact that such applications could not perform key operations such as 
file access or create new network connections.  If Web-browser vendors treated remote 
code like local code, the path would have been opened for malicious code to corrupt the 
local machine.  Such an all-or-none model was replaced in Java 1.1, when a trusted 
security model was employed [Pec00]. 
2.2.3 Java 1.1 Trusted Code Security Model 
With the trusted code model, the user can optionally designate whether code 
“signed” by certain providers is allowed to have the full resource access it desires.  Thus, 
a trust relationship can be established for Microsoft Java code to run inside of your 
browser with full access to system resources much like the trust that exists when one of 
many Microsoft products is installed on the local system.  Code or applet signing permits 
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a company like Microsoft to sign its applet so that the origin of the code can be verified.  
The signed applet grants access to all system resources, much like the traditional desktop 
method.  Untrusted code can still be confined to the sandbox, since each individual applet 
is treated with a discrete set of rules. 
2.2.4 Java 1.2 Configurable and Fine-Grained Access Security Model 
The Java 2 platform (also called Java 1.2) has much finer-grained application 
security.  With this new model, local and remote code alike can be confined to use only 
particular domains of resources according to configurable policies.  Consider, for 
example a Java code segment called Foo.  Foo may have limited access to resources 
which are confined within a single domain (defined via the Java application’s access 
control list).  Some other Java code, Bar, may have access to a set of resources confined 
by some other domain [Pec00].  Domains of access and configurable security policies 
make the Java 2 platform much more flexible.  This design abstracted the distinction 
between remote and local code, allowing developers to focus on a wider range of security 
problems (secrecy, authenticity, integrity, etc.), instead of focusing on the mobile code 
and Java applet security problems.  Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) was an obvious choice to 
take care of some of these other security problems.  Before discussing Java 
implementation of SSL, a quick look at SSL basics is in order. 
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2.3 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Basics 
2.3.1 SSL Protocol 
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is the most widely used security protocol 
for authentication on the Internet [ViM02].  It secures data exchanged between a client 
and a server by encrypting it.  In general, it provides three of the tenants of data security: 
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.  Authentication is the process of ensuring 
the “real” parties wishing to communicate do so and are not fooled by an entity 
impersonating an identity.  Authentication is achieved through the use of asymmetric 
public key encryption.  Integrity guarantees data exchanged with the server has not been 
modified along the way.  If it is, it can be detected through the use of the Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) [ViM02].  The MAC is generated during the SSL 
Handshake through a pseudo-random number generator and a secure hash algorithm.  
Finally, confidentiality is achieved through data encryption.  An eavesdropper cannot 
read the transmitted information by simply looking at the packets on the network.  The 
following sections give more detail about the two protocols that make up the Secure 
Sockets Layer protocol. 
a. Handshake Protocol 
The SSL HandShake Protocol is the most complex part of SSL.  It enables a 
server and client to authenticate each other, as well as negotiating encryption, 
MAC algorithm, and cryptographic keys.  It is used before any application data 
is sent.  Figure 1 shows a Handshake Protocol session. 
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SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL 
 
Figure 1: SSL Handshake Protocol 
 
b. Record Protocol 
When data is being transmitted, the Record Protocol receives unencrypted 
data from the higher layer (Handshake Protocol) and changes it into SSL 
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CipherText.  The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext 
records containing 214 bytes or less of data. Client message boundaries are not 
preserved in the record layer (i.e., multiple client messages of the same 
ContentType may be coalesced into a single TLSPlaintext record, or a single 
message may be fragmented across several records) [RFC2246].  It compresses 
the data and appends the Message Authentication Code (MAC).  Finally, before 
transmitting the data, it is encrypted with a shared symmetric key.   
If data is being received, the Record Protocol receives SSL CipherText from 
the TCP layer and decrypts using the shared symmetric key.  It uses the MAC to 
verify the integrity of the message and decompress the data.  Before sending the 
unencrypted data to the higher layers, it reassembles the fragmented data.  Figure 
2 depicts a Record Protocol session. 
 
Figure 2: SSL Record Protocol 
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2.3.2 Cipher Suites 
Cipher Suites are the building blocks SSL uses to provide authentication, integrity, 
and secrecy.  They are used in both of the SSL protocols and are selected based upon the 
handshake between the server and the client.  Since not all clients and servers are the 
same, SSL supports many different types of cipher suites.   
The two different SSL cryptographic algorithms, asymmetric and symmetric, use a 
combination of the available cipher suites to provide secure communications between the 
client and the server.  Which suite is selected is based upon the sensitivity of the data 
involved, the speed of the cipher, and the applicability of export restrictions on the 
stronger encryption algorithms. 
The asymmetric algorithm is used in the handshake protocol to authenticate the 
different parties, generate shared keys and secrets.  Asymmetric algorithms use much 
more complex numbers than do symmetric algorithms and are generally slower to process 
[ViM02].  These algorithms use a public/private key combination for authentication.  The 
public key can be known by anyone.  Only the owner knows the private key.  The public 
key is used by the client and server to encrypt and decrypt the premaster (used to generate 
the smaller shared symmetric key).  The public key is an inverse prime of the private key.  
This inverse property allows the server to decrypt a message encrypted with the 
corresponding public key.   
Symmetric algorithms are used to encrypt and verify the integrity of SSL records 
(application data).  A symmetric algorithm is used for the large data streams due to the 
speed with which the data can be encrypted and unencrypted.  Speed is critical when 
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maintaining a high traffic server.  The symmetric key is passed between the client and the 
server via the asymmetric method. 
Listed below are some of the cipher suites offered in most SSL implementations.  
a. DES – Data Encryption Standard [NIST99] 
b. DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm [NIST00] 
c. KEA – Key Exchange Algorithm [NIST98] 
d. MD5 – Message Digest algorithm developed by Rivest [RFC1321] 
e. RC2 and RC4 – Rivest ciphers developed for RSA Data Security [RFC2268] 
f. RSA – A public-key algorithm for both encryption and authentication.  
Developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RFC2437] 
g. RSA key exchange – A key exchange algorithm for SSL based on the RSA 
algorithm [NIST00] 
h. SHA-1 – Secure Hash Algorithm, developed by the U.S. Government [NIST95] 
i. Triple-DES – DES applied 3 times [NIST99] 
2.4 Java Security Architecture 
The Java security architecture is made up of three different parts.  These parts 
are the Core Java Security Architecture which contains the basic security 
capabilities, the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) which allows basic 
cryptography functionality for Java applications, and the Java Security Extensions 
(JSE) which allow various third party vendor implementations via standard 
interfaces such as SSL. 
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2.4.1 Core Java 2.0 Security Architecture 
The Core Java 2.0 Security Architecture has seven components.  The following is a 
short description of each.  The byte code verifier verifies that the byte codes being loaded 
from Java application code external to the Java platform adhere to the syntax of the Java 
language specification.  The class loader is responsible for actual translation of byte 
codes into Java class constructs that can be manipulated by the Java runtime 
environment.  In the process of loading classes, different class loaders may employ 
different policies to determine whether certain classes should even be loaded into the 
runtime environment.  The class loader and the Java 2 platform classes limit access to 
valued resources by intercepting calls made to Java platform APIs and delegating 
decisions as to whether such calls can be made to the security manager.  Java 1.0 and 1.1 
made exclusive use of a security manager for such decision making, whereas Java 2 
applications uses the access controller for more flexible and configurable access control 
decision making.  Finally, execution of code would not be possible without the runtime 
execution engine.  Access control was a significant addition to the Java 2 security 
architecture.  It extended the security model to allow configurable and fine-grained 
access control.  Java 2 permissions have configurable and extendable ways to designate 
access limitations and can be associated with valued resources.  Java policies provide the 
mechanisms needed to actually associate such permissions with valued resources in a 
configurable way.  Finally, the ability to encapsulate domains for access control are 
provided with the core Java 2 security model [PeC00]. 
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2.4.2 Java Cryptography Architecture 
The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) provides an infrastructure for performing 
basic cryptographic functionality with the Java platform.  The scope of cryptographic 
functionality includes protecting data against corruption using basic cryptographic 
functions and algorithms.  Cryptographic signature generation algorithms used for 
identifying sources of data and code are also built into the JCA.  Because keys and 
certificates are a core part of identifying data and code sources, APIs are also built into 
the JCA for handling such features. 
Even though the JCA is part of the built-in Java security packages as defined in the 
core Java 2 security architecture features, it is separate due to the JCA’s underlying 
service provider interface.  Different cryptographic implementations can be plugged into 
the JCA framework without affecting the Java applications.  The Object Oriented method 
by which the security framework is built allows this.  For developers who are not sure or 
do not care what cryptographic functions are used, there is a default set of cryptographic 
functions that are instantiated when JCA is used. 
2.4.3 Extensions 
a. Java Cryptography Extension 
The terms encryption and cryptography are sometimes used interchangeably.  
However, Sun Microsystems Inc. (referred to hereafter as Sun) adheres to a 
cryptographic definition that includes basic data integrity and source identity 
functions supported by the JCA.  Encryption are those functions used to encrypt 
blocks of data for the added sake of confidentiality until the data can be 
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subsequently decrypted by the intended receiver.  The Java Cryptography 
Extension (JCE) is provided as a Java security extension for these auxiliary 
encryption purposes.  It could be argued that encryption is a core aspect of any 
secure system.  However, Sun has purposely made JCE an extension to the Java 
architecture largely due to U.S. export restrictions on encryption technology.  If 
JCE was a core part of the Java architecture, exportability of the Java 
architecture itself would be hampered.  Although many commercial-grade 
encryption technologies have been developed by third parties, JCE includes a 
standard service provider and application programmer interface model.  Thus, 
different commercial-grade encryption implementations can be used and still 
provide the programmer with the same API to the different underlying 
implementations.  Another difference between the JCE and JCA is that the JCA 
primarily supports data protection for integrity via message digests and provides 
a means for identification of data, objects, and code using signatures, keys, and 
certificates.  The data, objects, and code are never encrypted.  This is part of 
JCE.  Where JCA relies on asymmetric public and private key infrastructure for 
secure identity, JCE relies on a symmetric key infrastructure for confidentiality. 
b. Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) 
It is important to describe the JSSE in context where it fits into the Java 
Architecture.  Since SSL is one of the more commonly used encryption-based 
protocols for integrity and confidentiality, Sun developed the JSSE as an 
extension to the Java security architecture.  JSSE provides a standard interface 
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along with an underlying reference implementation for building Java 
applications with SSL.  Different commercial-grade SSL implementations can be 
used with JSSE and still provide the same interface to the applications developer.  
This has advantages and disadvantages since some SSL implementations may be 
more prone to attack than others.  Some of these attacks are discussed later.  
JSSE is more generic to provide a standard interface to support other secure 
socket protocols such as the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Wireless 
Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocols. 
c. Java Authentication and Authorization Service 
The Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) extension to the 
Java security architecture was developed to provide a standard way to limit 
access to resources based on an authenticated user identity.  Thus, standard APIs 
for login and logout are provided such that a standard interface is available for 
passing around secure user credentials and context.  This makes it possible to 
swap in and out different underlying authentication model implementations.   
2.5 JSSE Implementation of SSL 
There is little open-literature on specific instances of where JSSE’s implementation 
is significantly different than that of most other implementations.  Building bad 
cryptographic systems is very easy to do, while building strong cryptographic systems is 
very hard and time consuming [Sch98].  Sun chose to use a cryptographic 
implementation that has been improved upon for a number of years and is now an 
accepted standard of the Internet Engineering Task Force.  This section explains the key 
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classes used in the JSSE Application Program Interface (API).  Keeping that in mind, a 
brief examination of the major class relationships for a JSSE SSL connection is given. 
For secure communication, both ends of an SSL connection (server and client) must 
be SSL-enabled.  Within the JSSE API, the endpoint class of the connection, and one of 
the core classes, is the SSLSocket.  In Figure 3 below, the major classes used to create 
SSLSockets are laid out in a logical ordering [Sun03]. 
 
Figure 3: JSSE classes used to create SSLSockets [Sun03]. 
 
An SSLSocket is created by either an SSLSocketFactory or an SSLServerSocket 
accepting an in-bound connection (See Appendix C for a description of the classes and 
functions).  Both SSLSocketFactory and SSLServerSocketFactory objects are created by 
an SSLContext.  Additionally, there are two ways to obtain and initialize an SSLContext. 
Key Material | Key Material | 
K«yManagerFactDry      I MyKM     I MvTM TrustManagerFactory   I 
K«yManag«r     | TrustManager    |   I SecureRandoi   h 
SSLSocketFacto 
SSLSocket 
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I    SSLSock^t      I 
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The simplest is to call the getDefault method on either of the Factory classes.  This 
causes a default KeyManager, TrustManager, and a secure random number generator to 
be created.  This process uses key material found in the default keystore as determined by 
system properties described in “Customizing the Default Key and Trust Stores, Store 
Types, and Store Passwords” section of the JSSE Reference Guide for Java 2 SDK 
Standard Edition V1.4.2 [Sun03]. 
Another approach that gives the caller the most control over the behavior of the 
created SSLContext, is to call the static method getInstance on the SSLContext class, and 
initialize the context by calling the init method.  This method takes three arguments 
(array of KeyManager objects, array of TrustManager objects, and a SecureRandom 
random number generator.  This allows the caller to dictate what cipher suites are 
allowed when creating the SSLSession.  For instance, DES is a valid algorithm (56 bit 
key) but not very strong due to its short key length.  DES3 is a more secure solution to 
implement on the session, though not necessarily the most efficient.   
Although key length is important, it is actually a minor player in building secure 
cryptographic systems.  It is a piece of the puzzle, but even a 168-bit key (DES3) does 
not protect the data if other parts of the cryptographic system itself are inherently flawed 
[Sch98].  There are many avenues of attack on a network connection [Rei96].  The next 
few sections look at some other ways to attack a cryptographic system. 
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2.6 Malformed SSL Communications 
This section covers items of interest that should be validated during the testing phase 
of any application.  The valid fields and ranges associated with the SSLSession 
communication between the client and the server are explained below.  
2.6.1 Malformed SSL Messages.   
Earlier sections described how SSL communications occur at the TCP and SSL 
protocol levels.  Software can store input values or the results of computations internally 
in one or more data structures to be retrieved or passed for use in computation or output 
generation.  Any type of software is set up for failure if it stores illegal data.  So, care 
must be taken to keep the data structures free of such corruption [Whi03].  The two major 
areas to focus on for SSL are the legal ranges of the fields within the protocols that make 
up SSL.  We focus on the two that are most used; the Record and Handshake Protocols. 
2.6.2 Correctness of Cipher Suite Handling 
Another area of concern within SSL communications is the correctness of the cipher 
suites.  Each side of an SSL session is supposed to be able to have a list of preferred 
cipher suites and what order they appear.  A couple of questions need to be answered to 
determine if there are weaknesses in this area for the JSSE implementation.  Does JSSE 
implement this list correctly?  Some older SSL implementations did not, and thus allowed 
an unscrupulous server to force a client to use a weaker cipher suite than it should.  Also, 
does JSSE allow this kind of attack? 
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2.7 Timing and Cryptographic Attacks on SSL 
This section discusses additional mechanisms hackers may use to break SSL 
encryption.  Specifically, padding attacks, timing attacks, and random number generation 
are discussed.  These attacks are not aimed at finding weaknesses within an encryption 
algorithm.  At this point, the hacker is assuming the proverbial front door is locked.  
Now, the hunt is for weaknesses in the implementation of the cryptography.  This is 
analogous to using a six inch steel front door only to leave all windows opened. 
2.7.1 Padding Attacks 
Padding is used in encryption algorithms to hide the length of the actual data and 
prevent certain dictionary; replay/déjà vu attacks on encrypted data.  One thing 
cryptographers have to do is make sure any fix or patch put in place does not create 
additional problems.  Unfortunately, this is difficult to do.  This opens the system for 
padding attacks.  Basically, this can occur if an attacker knows the algorithm used to 
institute the padding (Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), Message Digest-5 (MD5), etc.,) 
and the algorithm is not sufficiently random or strong.  The attacker will find a way to 
derive important data about the cleartext or even about the factorization of N, where N is 
the RSA modulus [Nac99].  With the factorization of N, the public and private keys used 
to encrypt and decrypt the message can be derived.  The Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4.1 
implementation of the Java Cryptography Extension has several different options to 
choose from.  They include: 
1. No padding 
2. Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding 
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3. PKCS5Padding – Password-Based Encryption Standard 
4. SSL3Padding – defined in SSL Protocol Version 3.0 
This last option is offered in SunJCE but is not supported.  None of these padding 
algorithms, except “no padding”, are known to have any inherent flaws. 
Another example of a padding attack, the Bleichenbacher attack isn’t really a true 
padding attack [BoB03].  This attack takes advantage of a poor implementation of 
padding.  In PKCS version 1, the padding algorithm added a 16-bit “02” to the beginning 
of the packet.  If we know the first two characters, this is usually enough to break the 
encryption.  For example, suppose Ivan intercepts a ciphertext C intended for Bob and 
wants to decrypt it.  To mount the attack, Ivan picks a random r in the set Z from 1 – N, 
computes C’ = rC mod N, and sends C’ to Bob’s machine.  An application running on 
Bob’s machine receives C’ and attempts to decrypt it.  It either responds with an error 
message or doesn’t respond at all .  This allows Ivan to learn whether the most significant 
16 bits of the decryption of C’ are equal to “02”.  In effect, Ivan has an oracle that tests 
for him whether the 16 most significant bits of the decryption of rC mod N are equal to 
02, for any r of his choosing.  Bleichenbacher showed that such an oracle is sufficient for 
decrypting C [Bon99].  
2.7.2 SSL timing  
Timing attacks are simple in concept, but difficult to implement in a wide area 
network.  They basically send an encrypted message back to the target system.  But, 
instead of using the proper public key, they encrypt the message with the attacker’s guess 
of q where N is the RSA modulus and N = pq where p and q are sufficiently large primes 
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with q < p [Bob03].  The attack measures how much time it takes the target system to 
compute the fact that the message was encrypted with the wrong key.  This attack 
basically discovers “q” one bit at a time based upon the time it takes to receive an error 
response back from the target system.   
There are mechanisms that can be implemented to deny this activity.  One way and 
probably the simplest is to set some random wait time before calculating the key.  
Another more elegant way is called RSA hiding.  This techniques picks some random 
number r, where r is in the set of numbers 1 – N, e is the public key, d is the private key, 
C is enciphered M, and M is the original plain text message.  It then calculates C’ = C * re 
mod N.  Now it will apply d to C’ and obtains M’ = C’d mod N.  At the last step, the 
original message is recovered by setting M = M’/r mod N.  With this approach the target 
system is applying the private key to a random message derived from r.  Since there is no 
knowledge of the bitstream that d was applied to, the attacker cannot gain an advantage 
by measuring the time.  Not all implementations of SSL use RSA hiding.  At the present, 
it is unknown if JSSE utilizes it. 
2.7.3 Random Number Generation  
Practical cryptography relies on the availability of a good source of randomness or at 
least a good source of pseudo-randomness.  In Sun's JDK, the 
java.security.SecureRandom class provides security-grade pseudo-randomness. 
Sun's implementation of the default provider for this class uses the SHA1 algorithm 
as the foundation for its random number generation.  It seeds the pseudo-random number 
generator with a random value derived from thread timings.   
 
36 
2.8 Denial of Service and Resource Exhaustion Possibilities 
This area of the thesis investigates how well Java handles resource 
exhaustion or denial of service attempts.  To determine the performance, the 
number of JSSE SSL sessions allowed before system failure is examined. 
Additionally, a virtually identical OpenSSL server implementation will be used 
for determine possible differences in operational execution speeds resulting from 
different implementations.  Each implementation will be examined for modifiable 
are to determine the consumption of resources and the overall impact on security 
performance that may result. 
2.9 Tools 
The tools use in this research include: Windows perfmon utility, UNIX Top utility, 
Ethereal protocol analyzer, JMP statistical package, Microsoft Excel, and Turbo C.  The 
performance monitor utility in the Windows operating system provides the ability to 
record the application parameters such as memory and CPU utilization and then display 
them online in graph and report views.  It was used in this research to gather server 
performance data.  The UNIX Top utility gathers memory and CPU utilization data on 
UNIX systems in a variety of formats.  For this research, it was used to gather data on the 
Linux server.  Ethereal was used to verify data encryption, validate the correct algorithm 
was selected, and to gather data on the round trip time for secure socket data.  JMP is an 
interactive software tool especially designed for statistical visualization and exploratory 
data analysis.  Microsoft Excel was used to analyze the data from the Top and Perfmon 
utilities, and Turbo C was the programming language used to code various data 
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conversion routines to convert the data from the Top utility to a format to be used in the 
Excel analysis. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter provides background information on the research topic.  In it, the 
history of security in Java is discussed, as well as the basics of the Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol.  Its intent was to familiarize the reader as to why SSL was incorporated 
into Java via the Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE).  After history, the current Java 
Security Architecture and the JSSE implementation of SSL were discussed.  These two 
sections provided information and sources as to how SSL was implemented into Java.  
The chapter concludes with background information on certain attacks to which the Java 
implementation of SSL may be susceptible, as well as the tools used in this research.   
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3.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodology and simulation setup of the research effort.  
It includes the problem definition, goals and hypothesis of the research.  It also defines 
the system boundaries, system services, and performance metrics.  From those 
definitions, the parameters and factors are identified.  The chapter concludes with the 
experimental design, the evaluation technique, and the workload. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
The added flexibility and security provided by JSSE is attractive to commercial 
companies as well as government organizations.  Before the use of the JSSE libraries 
becomes widespread within the DoD, it’s prudent to perform an analysis on the code to 
find its strengths and weaknesses.  
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
The goals of this research are to determine the following:  
• Does JAVA 1.4.2 use RSA blinding to prevent cryptographic timing attacks?  
It is believed that Java implemented the RSA blinding technique.  This 
research determines if this is true and if it is the default configuration. 
• Compare similar implementations of JSSE’s implementation of SSL and 
OpenSSL’s implementation of SSL.  Specifically, determine the point at 
which each system’s resources become exhausted and become unusable to the 
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SSL users, and also determine what/if any performance differences in terms of 
maximum number of secure sockets are derived from using 128, 192, and 256 
bit symmetric keys within the AES, DES3, and RC4 encryption algorithms.  
Between the three different algorithms, AES is expected to perform 
significantly better since it’s one generation ahead of the other two algorithms, 
and was selected through open competition to become the new standard 
replacing DES [NIST01].  The increased size of the symmetric keys will 
likely impact performance, though to what degree is unknown.  Even though 
128-bit symmetric key encryption is widely acknowledged as being virtually 
impossible to break through brute force, 192 or 256 would be better as long as 
there is not a significant reduction in speed. 
3.2.2 Goal 1 Approach (Timing Attack Protection) 
The second goal involves a well-known cryptographic vulnerability: timing attacks.  
Timing attacks enable an attacker to extract secrets from a secure system by observing 
the amount of time taken by the system to respond to various requests.  Until recently, 
these attacks were thought to only apply to slower hardware systems such as smartcards.  
Attacks on web servers were unlikely since the decryption time of the encrypted text are 
masked by the many concurrent processes running on the system, as well as the latency 
introduced by propagation delay of networks in the client-server environment.  Research 
at Stanford University has demonstrated these assumptions were false [BoB03].  The 
research conclusively showed that in an OpenSSL application it was indeed possible to 
implement a timing attack across a network against a RSA keying system [BoB03].  They 
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suggest a RSA blinding scheme to mask the calculation time required for decryption.  
During the research, it was determined with the release of Java J2SDK 1.4.2 RSA 
blinding is automatically implemented with the built in JSSE libraries.  No further work 
was accomplished on this portion of the research.   
3.2.3 Goal 2 Approach (Performance Comparison) 
As a final goal, a performance comparison between four popular symmetric 
encryption algorithms provided in Java’s implementation of SSL is conducted. 
Specifically, the point at which each system’s resources are exhausted and the system is 
unusable to the SSL users is determined.  Symmetric key size, JVM heap size, and 
symmetric encryption algorithm are all factors for this analysis.   
3.3 System Boundaries 
The system under test (SUT) is shown in Figure 4 and includes the SSL over TCP 
protocol system and the operating system network stack.  The SUT does not include the 
workstations or servers, nor does it include any of the routers or physical wiring.   
 
Figure 4: System Under Test 
 
The components under test (CUT) are shown in italics in Figure 4.  It includes the 
operating system and the JSSE implementation of SSL.  Although there are other 
SSL
TCP
JSSE 
O/S Network Stack iWin200&lJmix) 
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implementations of SSL, this effort is limited to JSSE.  Comparisons drawn between 
Win2000 and Redhat Linux should be based on a JSSE implementation on both operating 
systems.   
3.4 System Services 
The service provided by the system is an encrypted channel where data is securely 
passed.  Possible outcomes are: 
1. A successful secure transmission of data – the data is transferred between the 
client and server successfully and encrypted. 
2. An unsuccessful transmission of data – the data does not reach its destination. 
3. An unsecure transmission of data – the data is transferred between the client 
and server, but it is sent unencrypted. 
3.5 Performance Metrics 
The output performance metrics of this research are tied to the second goal defined 
above.   The only metric for Goal 2 is the maximum number of secure sockets created 
between the clients and the server.  The possible outcome of an unsecure transmission of 
data is excluded as a metric because a properly verified and validated SSL simulation 
does not send data in the clear. 
3.6 Parameters 
3.6.1 System 
The system parameters include: 
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• JSSE version 1.0.3 is the standard packaged with Java SDK version 1.4.2 SE.   
• The Cipher Block Chaining encryption mode of the symmetric keys is used.  
• Block encryption requires padding to fill out the remainder of an unused 
packet.  There is an option to not use padding, but it’s not secure since it 
reveals the length of the data being sent, and within the confines of SunJSSE 
provider, it would preclude using symmetric encryption at all [Sun03]. 
• Symmetric key size is used because it directly impacts the performance and 
security of the data transmission. 
• Hardware: 1GHz Intel Pentium III, 512 MB RAM, 20 GB HDD, 100 Mbit 
Fast Ethernet, Linux host on NIS domain with 1 server, Win2000 host on 
Win2000 domain with 2 domain controllers.   
3.6.2 Workload 
Workload parameters are limited to the number of concurrent SSL connections and 
the size of the data transmission.  The concurrent SSL connections are used to establish 
when the SSL server is unable to service any more connections.  The size of the data 
transmission is fixed so other factors can be studied. 
The workload is applied within the logic of the simulation program.  Each SSL 
connection is created as individual threads, and pauses for one second after every 
successful connection (see Figure 5).  The one second pause is used to prevent premature 
overloading of the server.  Also associated with the workload is the number of SSL 
sockets each client creates.  A maximum number of 600 were implemented for each 
instantiation of the client software.  The number 600 was chosen so as not to reach the 
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~734 socket maximum identified earlier in the pilot studies for a default heap size.  The 
default heap size on the client JVM was not changed as part of the experiment.  As the 
clients hit their maximum socket limit, more clients were initialized in order to reach the 
server maximum SSL socket limit.  All the initialized sockets continued to pass traffic 
after initialization until the server reached it maximum limit. 
 
Figure 5:  Multiple thread code 
 
The size of the data transmission simulates three different types of SSL applications.  
The first data size of 16 bytes simulates an application with small data transactions.  This 
is the smallest data size available for SSL data using cipher block chaining.  Cipher block 
chaining effectively expanded any data block to the next 16 byte value.  The second data 
size of 1418 bytes simulates large data transactions.  Pilot studies showed that a data size 
of 1418 bytes was needed to completely fill the 1500 bytes of an Ethernet Frame.  The 
third data size was chosen to split the difference between the first two data sizes and the 
data size of 768 was arbitrarily chosen.   
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3.7 Factors 
Factors, their justification and values are listed below: 
• Symmetric Key Size:  128, 168, and 256-bit. The key lengths are chosen 
based on the encryption algorithm and on analysis by an ad hoc group of 
cryptographers and computer scientists [BlD96].  According to the analysis, a 
90-bit key is the minimum needed today to ensure the security of a symmetric 
key system against a brute force attack.  Although this analysis is seven years 
old, it has held true over the past few years.  For instance, there have been 
some successful brute force attacks on 128-bit symmetric key encryption, but 
the attacks have taken months to perform.  The 128-bit key is the unofficial 
standard today, 168 bit is the only size allowed in DES3, and 256 is the largest 
key size currently available in Java 1.4.2 with the AES algorithm.  The 128-bit 
keys are expected to be faster. 
• Encryption Algorithm: RC4, AES, and DES3.  These algorithms are some of 
the most commonly used today.  AES lends itself to comparisons since it is 
the only one currently available in different key sizes within the Java 1.4.3 
code.  AES is expected to be a faster algorithm. 
• Operating System:  Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3 were chosen so 
some comparison can be drawn between two different SSL implementations.  
The JSSE version of Windows 2000 and Linux is stable and is used for 
analysis on both systems.  The Linux implementation of JSSE will likely be 
faster than the Win2000 implementation of JSSE. 
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3.8 Evaluation Technique 
As with the performance metrics, the evaluation techniques only apply to the fourth 
goal.  The other three goals were met by verification of certain design methodology 
(range checking, defaults of Sun’s PRNG, and the implementation of RSA blinding in the 
latest JSSE libraries).  A prototype JSSE program was developed to determine the 
maximum socket limit when implementing SSL.  The simulation program is validated by 
developing the program in accordance with a highly secure construct available within a 
JSSE program.  A less secure design could enable more sockets to be established before 
server failure by not taxing the processor or memory with long encryption key 
calculations.  The design addressed the hash function, the asymmetric encryption 
algorithm, and symmetric key encryption.  The next several sections layout the design 
and how these functions were implemented to provide a secure simulation. 
3.8.1 Cryptographic Hash Function 
A cryptographic hash function is similar to a checksum. Data is processed with an 
algorithm that produces a relatively small string of bits called a hash. A cryptographic 
hash function has three primary characteristics: it is a one-way function, meaning that it 
is not possible to produce the original data from the hash; a small change in the original 
data produces a large change in the resulting hash; and it does not require a cryptographic 
key [Sun03].   
When applying a hash to the message authentication code, it is sometimes referred to 
as a HMAC.  HMAC can be used with any cryptographic hash function, such as Message 
Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), in combination with a secret shared 
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key. HMAC is specified in RFC 2104.  These also happen to be the two hash functions 
considered in the development of the simulation.  SHA-1 was chosen because of it’s 
slightly stronger encryption due to it longer hash value (160 versus 128 bit for MD5).  No 
known attacks against SHA were found, while there have been a few against MD5 that 
could not be extended (to show inherent weakness in the algorithm).  There is a slight 
tradeoff in speed.  More information about MD5 and SHA can be found in the RFCs 
(1321 for MD5 and 3174 for SHA) 
3.8.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
 The asymmetric encryption setup was more problematic in its implementation than 
other security functions.  The implementation involved server side only authentication 
(ie., an https type application) with 1024 bit RSA Public Key encryption.  The public key 
is wrapped in an X.509 certificate and is self signed (no certificate authority was used).  
Typically you would not use a self-signed certificate unless you trusted the source.  For 
the simulation, a trusted third party was not necessary.  After the server’s public key was 
wrapped in a certificate, it was physically copied to each client used in the simulation.  
The server and client simulation programs were then written to incorporate a keystore 
and a truststore.  The instructions for configuration and Java keytool usage is laid out in 
the JSSE Reference Guide [Sun03].  Figure 6 shows the source code used in the 
simulation program to implement the asymmetric key encryption design. 
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Figure 6: Source code for asymmetric key encryption. 
 
3.8.3 Symmetric Key Encryption 
The symmetric key encryption algorithms were chosen based on the factors of this 
analysis.  JSSE has a default list of cipher suites it implements, and chooses them based 
on Table 1. 
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Table 1: SunJSSE supported cipher suites [Sun03]. 
Supported Cipher Suites in Default Preference Order 
 Name Enabled by Default 
New in  
J2SE 1.4.2 
 SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5  X   
 SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA  X   
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA X X  
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA X X  
 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA X X 
 SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA X   
 SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA X  X 
 SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA X   
 SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA X   
 SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA X X 
 SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA X   
 SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 X   
 SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA X X  
 SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA X X  
 SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA X   
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA *   X 
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA *   X  
 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA *   X  
 SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5     
 SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA     
 SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5     
 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA    X 
 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA *    X 
 SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     
 SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA     
 SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5     
 SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA     
 
Those items marked with an “*” require installation of the JCE Unlimited Strength 
Jurisdiction Policy Files.   
 
49 
This analysis only required four of the cipher suites, and one of these required the 
JCE Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy Files.  These can be found at 
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/download.html.  The four cipher suites used were: 
• SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (128 bit RC4 encryption with SHA hash) 
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (128 bit AES encryption with SHA hash) 
• SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (168 bit 3DES encryption with SHA 
hash) 
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (256 bit AES encryption with SHA hash) 
Figure 7 shows the simulation program code implementing each of the cipher suites.  
Only one cipher suite was instantiated on the client for each simulation run.  This ensured 
only the cipher suite being tested could be agreed upon by the server and the client. 
 
Figure 7: Symmetric key cipher suite implementation 
3.9 Experimental Design 
The experimental design is full factorial.  It tests the failure/resource exhaustion of 
the JSSE implementation.  The number of experiments required for a single sample value 
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of all the different combinations is:  4 (encryption algorithms) * 4 (heap sizes) * 3 (data 
sizes) = 48. 
To determine the number of repetitions for the experiments, some assumptions are 
made about the maximum number of sockets.  Based on pilot studies, the mean for a 
maximum number of secure sockets with the default heap size of 64 MB on the Java 
Virtual Machine (JVM) is 734.06.  Observed variability for the pilot study data is 2.8625 
sockets with a standard deviation of 1.69 sockets.   
Testing for normality was used to determine if the Central Limit Theorem could be 
used to determine how many replications should be accomplished of each simulation.  
The method used here is the Lilliefors test for normality.  The test basically compares the 
observed relative cumulative frequency distribution of the sample to that of the standard 
normal distribution.  The two curves in the middle of Figure 8 represent the cumulative 
distribution of the observed data and a standard normal curve.  Curves to either side 
represent the Lilliefors bounds for a sample size of 12 and a significance of 0.01 (99 
percent confidence).  If the observed relative cumulative frequency falls outside the 
bounds given for the specified sample size, then the data is not from a normal 
distribution.  Since the curve representing the observed data does not fall outside the 
bounds, we can be 99 percent confident that the data is from a normal distribution.  
Therefore, the data is considered normally distributed and the Central Limit Theorem is 
used to analyze the data.   
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Figure 8:  Pilot Study (Lilliefors graph) 
 
Based on these observations, the following equations, and the assumption that 
normality will hold on larger heap and data sizes: 
1. )/,( nNx σµ≈  (sample mean calculation). 
2. ntxIC /*.. σ±=   (calculation for a Confidence Interval). 
Using previous assumptions about the mean and standard deviation, as well as a 
confidence interval of 90% and plugging those numbers into the equations: 
)4/8625.2(*353.206.734.. ±=IC = (730.692, 737.428). 
Therefore, four repetitions of the 48 experiments are likely needed.  A total of 192 
experiments is performed.  
3.10 Summary 
The focus of this chapter is on the simulation design and methodology of the 
research effort.  It includes the problem definition, as well as defined the system 
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boundaries, system services, and performance metrics.  From those definitions the 
parameters and factors were identified and discussed.  The chapter concludes with the 
experimental design, the evaluation technique, and the workload used in the analysis 
effort. 
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4. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the analysis and results of the research effort.  Simulation data 
is presented and explained in order to answer the investigative questions of Chapter 3.   
The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings. 
4.2 Results of Simulation Scenarios 
A quick scan of the data reveals that, as the heap size increases, so does the number 
of secure sockets that can be created (see Table 2).  This is because each socket requires a 
fixed amount of resources from the heap.  Creating sockets without closing any 
eventually uses up all the space allocated in the heap.  The first section of Table 2 shows 
the average number of sockets each encryption algorithm supports with the associated 
heap size.  There are twelve values averaged for each cell, three data sizes (16, 768, and 
1418) and four replications of each unique configuration.  The second section of Table 2 
shows the standard deviation for the values that were averaged in the first part. 
Appendix A shows the data gathered for the socket limit.  The naming convention is 
as follows:  AES128h64d1418_win indicates the AES 128-bit encryption algorithm, with 
a JVM heap size of 64 MB, an encrypted data size of 1418 bytes, and the simulation 
server was run on a Win2000 operating system.  
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Table 2: Average/Standard Deviation of Maximum Number of Secure Sockets 
 
Average RC4 AES128 AES256 DES3
64 MB 736 734 729 744
96 MB 1106 1104 1095 986
256 MB 2523 2289 2211 1673
384 MB 2589 2488 2412 1769
Standard DeviationRC4 AES128 AES256 DES3
64 MB 2 2 1 1
96 MB 3 3 2 199
256 MB 490 575 603 974
384 MB 720 869 904 1343
Heap 
size
Encryption Algorithm
Heap 
size
 
 
 
Another interesting result is the different maximum numbers of sockets between the 
encryption algorithms given a heap size of 256 and greater.  The standard deviation is a 
measure of variability in the data.  A rise in the standard deviation is a sign of increased 
variability in the data samples.  Table 2 provides some insight into different maximum 
number of sockets occurring in the different algorithms.  For DES3 the data variability 
increases with a heap size of 96 MB.  The other algorithms increased variability does not 
begin at this point. The DES3 simulations are used to explain what is happening. 
Table 3 shows the average maximum socket values recorded for the DES3 
simulations with heap sizes of 64 MB, 96 MB, 256 MB, and 384 MB.  As evident from 
Table 3, there is not much variance between the samples in the 64 MB heap size.  
However, a heap size of 96MB shows a significant drop (35 percent) in the number of 
secure sockets that can be created with a data size of 1418 bytes.  This shows that data 
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size is probably going to be a significant factor in the variance of the data.  This assertion 
is proved later on in this chapter when the variance analysis is conducted.   
Table 3: Averages for DES3 Maximum Number of Secure Sockets 
 
  Encrypted Data Size (bytes) 
 Average 1418 768 16
Heap Size 64MB 743 743 745
 96 MB 721 1117 1119
 256 MB 936 1095 2988
 384 MB 723 1003 3580
 
 
At this point, it appears something else besides heap size is limiting the maximum 
number of secure socket creation.  It is interesting that the 256 MB heap size showed 
improvement while the 384 MB heap size did not.  Taking this into account, we need to 
see if the mean is a good statistic to use for comparing the maximum number of sockets.  
For example, it is not very useful to use the mean when two sample values between 
replications are significantly different.  The standard deviation of the data, given in Table 
4, can help determine if this is the case.   
Table 4: Standard Deviation for DES3 Maximum Secure Sockets 
 
Standard Deviation 1418 768 16
64MB 1 1 1
96 MB 71 2 2
256 MB 42 34 18
384 MB 37 49 16
Encrypted Data Size (bytes)
Heap 
Size
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It is evident there is much more variability in the data for heap sizes of 256 and 384, 
and also for a heap size of 96 MB with a data size of 1418 bytes.  Since this is the case, 
the mean for those instances just show that generally speaking, there is a decrease in the 
maximum number of sockets as the data size gets larger.  The high variance in the data at 
the 256 MB and 384 MB levels still falls within acceptable limits for the four replication 
simulation.  The next section evaluates what resource could be limiting the maximum 
socket number, and provides answers as to why it’s impacting the variance of the 
simulation data more so than the smaller heap sizes did. 
A computer system has a finite set of resources.  The limiting resource could be a 
number of things (main memory, virtual memory, CPU, and network bandwidth).  By 
limiting the heap size to a fraction (75 percent) of available main memory, it was made a 
factor for variation and analysis.  It was also a resource capable of being monitored for 
resource exhaustion.  Given the controlled environment, network bandwidth and CPU 
utilization are the only other resources that could account for the high data variance 
across simulations.  Network bandwidth is a limiting factor if the socket creation fails due 
to waiting on network bandwidth where the client request times out before receiving an 
answer from the server.  In order to rule out network bandwidth, the round trip time for 
DES3 secure socket connections was examined.  Since a heap size of 96 MB had 
significant variation in the maximum number of sockets created, this data is examined to 
see if network bandwidth had an impact.  If network bandwidth was responsible for the 
inconsistencies, there should be a trend upwards over time.  Figures 9, 10, and 11 show 
the round trip time for the DES3 samples with a heap size of 96 MB. 
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Figure 9: Round Trip Time (RTT) for 16 Byte Data Packets, 96 MB Heap, and DES3 
Encryption. 
 
 
Figure 10: Round Trip Time (RTT) for 768 Byte Data Packets, 96 MB Heap, and DES3 
Encryption 
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The y-axis on these figures represent the round trip time in seconds for one data 
packet.  The x-axis represents the sequence number of the Ethernet packets.  If bandwidth 
was causing the bottleneck, some type of rise along the y-axis indicating an increase in 
the RTT would be observable.  This is not occurring, and therefore network bandwidth 
can be ruled out as the limiting resource.  In the 16-byte and 768-byte simulations, the 
resource limit was on the heap size.  This was demonstrated by the “out of memory” error 
received while running the simulation. 
 
Figure 11: Round Trip Time (RTT) for 1418 Byte Data Packets, 96 MB Heap, and DES3 
Encryption 
 
For the 1418 byte data size neither the memory nor the network bandwidth is the 
limiting resource because there was no “out of memory” error, and Figures 9, 10, and 11 
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show network bandwidth was not the issue.  Therefore, the CPU utilization must be 
considered as a limiting performance factor.  Using the same logic as in the network 
bandwidth analysis, the analysis once again used the DES3 encryption algorithm with a 
heap size of 96 MB.  If CPU utilization is the limiting resource, its graph over time 
should show an incline up towards 100 percent utilization.  This analysis examines the 
CPU utilization for the Java process.  Note that variability in the utilization can occur as 
the process waits for CPU time.  Figures 12, 13, and 14 illustrate that data sizes of 768 
and 1418 bytes have a much greater impact on the CPU utilization than a data size of 16 
bytes.   
 
Figure 12: CPU Utilization for DES3 Simulation With Heap Size 96MB and Encrypted 
Data Size of 16 Bytes 
 
When the memory resource (heap size) is used up, the program terminates giving an 
“out of memory” error.  Since each socket requires the same amount of resources, the 
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and sometimes succeed.   Simulations were terminated when five consecutive secure 
connections were unable to be created and pass encrypted data.  It was difficult to predict 
whether this would occur or not when the CPU was fully utilized. 
 
Figure 13: CPU Utilization for DES3 Simulation With Heap Size 96MB and Encrypted 
Data Size of 768 Bytes 
 
 
Figure 14: CPU Utilization for DES3 Simulation With Heap Size 96MB and Encrypted 
Data Size of 1418 Bytes 
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The data shown in Appendix B illustrates the relationship between the number of 
sockets created and the associated CPU percentage for all simulations performed with a 
heap size of 384 MB. From these graphs, while all the algorithms hit 80 percent CPU 
utilization much faster when the encrypted data size is large (1418 bytes), DES3 and 
AES256 appear to be more affected, with DES3 being the most impacted.  This indicates 
the higher the symmetric key size, the more load on the CPU.  The CPU utilization 
presented here is only what is used by the Java process.  It is not the CPU utilization of 
every process on the server.   The data shown in Appendix B also indicates the 168-bit 
DES3 algorithm is not as efficient as the 256-bit AES256 algorithm.  This is based on 
how quickly the DES3 algorithm reached 80-100 percent CPU utilization.  This validates 
a reason why the AES algorithm was chosen as the new standard to replace DES3.  RC4 
and AES128 were much more efficient as far as CPU utilization, which is expected since 
these algorithms only use a 128-bit symmetric key.  Still to be determined is what has the 
most impact on the number of secure sockets that can be created between all the different 
factors (encryption algorithm - A, heap size - H, and encrypted data size - D).  This 
question is answered by performing an analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Using the data in Appendix A, an ANOVA table is created to easily determine what 
factors have statistically significant impact on the maximum number of sockets that can 
be created.  There are three main effects, three first-order interactions, and one second-
order interaction.  Table 5 shows the ANOVA table used to perform the analysis. 
There were a total of 192 experiments used to analyze the maximum number of 
secure sockets created.  Appendix A lists the measured values from the experiments.  As 
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is seen, the number of sockets has a wide range, the ratio of which is 3300/698, or about 
5.  Performing a log transformation of the data stabilizes the variance in the data.  Table 6 
shows the transformed data. 
Table 5: ANOVA Table for Maximum Socket Analysis 
Component 
Sum of 
Squares 
Percentage 
of Variation
Degrees 
of 
Freedom
Mean 
Square 
F-
Computed 
F-
Table 
Significant 
at  0.05 
level 
SSY 1891.09  192     
SS0 1869.76  1     
SST 21.33 100 191     
Main Effects 
SSD 1.12 5.23 2 0.56 57.24 3.1 Significant 
SSH 6.83 32.04 3 2.28 233.68 2.72 Significant 
SSA 0.53 2.51 3 0.18 18.28 2.72 Significant 
First Order 
Interactions 
SSDH 8.32 39.02 6 1.39 142.31 2.2 Significant 
SSDA 0.01 0.07 6 0.002 0.24 2.2 Not 
Significant 
SSHA 0.41 1.91 9 0.05 4.65 2 Significant 
Second 
Order 
Interactions 
SSDHA 2.7 12.64 18 0.15 15.37 1.72 Significant 
Errors 
SSE 1.40 6.58 144 0.01 1   
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Table 6: Log Transformed Socket Data 
 
Algorithm Data Size 64 96 256 384
16 2.87 3.04 3.46 3.56
768 2.87 3.04 3.38 3.33
1418 2.87 3.04 3.20 3.22
16 2.86 3.04 3.47 3.56
768 2.86 3.04 3.34 3.31
1418 2.86 3.04 3.18 3.20
16 2.87 3.05 3.48 3.55
768 2.87 3.05 3.04 3.00
1418 2.87 2.86 2.97 2.86
16 2.86 3.04 3.47 3.55
768 2.86 3.04 3.44 3.37
1418 2.87 3.04 3.27 3.28
RC4
Heap Size
AES128
AES256
DES3
 
From Table 5, all the factors except the first order interaction between data size (D) 
and encryption algorithm (A) were statistically significant.  However, there were a couple 
that were much more significant.  Data size, heap size, and the first order interaction 
between data and heap size had the most impact on the variance (over 75 percent between 
those three).   
From this analysis, it can be concluded that data size and heap size have the most 
impact on the variance of the number of secure sockets that can be created given the test 
system. However, it is of primary interest to find the best combination of the three factors 
for providing efficient means to create the greatest number of secure sockets without 
reaching a system resource limitation.  The range method was used to find the average 
response corresponding to each level of the factor, and then to find the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum of the averages.  A factor with a large range is 
 
64 
considered important.  Table 7 shows the data for this method.  Table 7 columns indicate 
the level of the factor.  Data Size level 1 is 16 bytes, level 2 is 768 bytes, and level 3 is 
1418 bytes.  Algorithm level 1 is AES 128-bit, level 2 is AES 256-bit, level 3 is DES3 
168-bit, and level 4 is RC4 128-bit.  Heap Size level 1 is 64 MB, level 2 is 96 MB, level 
3 is 256 MB, and level 4 is 384 MB.  
Table 7: Factor Averages and Range for Secure Sockets 
16, 
AES128, 
H64
768, 
AES256, 
H96
1418, 
DES3, 
H256
RC4, 
H384
Range of 
Averages
Data Size 2091 1418 1170 none 921
Algorithm 1654 1612 1293 1737 444
Heap Size 735 1073 2174 2314 1579
From Table 7, the items in bold are considered the best in terms of ranges.  Data 
sizes are excluded from consideration since these values should not be limited based on 
the external performance limitations of the secure system. With a value of 1293 average 
sockets created, DES3 was the worse performing algorithm in the study.  AES128, 
AES256, and RC4 had similar performance statistics.  With the additional security 
provided by the longer key size in AES256, it is more attractive at this point than either 
AES128 or RC4.  For a heap size setting, it is believed that a heap size of 256 MB is 
better in this configuration, because it offered the greatest increase in performance.  It 
achieves an average of a 200 percent increase over a heap size of 64 MB, a 100 percent 
increase over a heap size of 96 MB, and just a 6 percent decrease over the average that 
was achieved with a 384 MB heap size  
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4.3 Investigative Questions Answered 
This section documents the answers for the investigative questions posed in Chapter 
3 of this document.  The questions and corresponding answers are documented in the 
next several sections of this thesis. 
4.3.1 RSA Blinding 
Does JAVA 1.4.2 use RSA blinding to prevent cryptographic timing attacks?  It was 
believed that Java implemented the RSA blinding technique.  This research determined 
that with the release of Java 1.4.2, it is indeed implemented and is the default.  In fact, no 
way was found to turn it off and still use RSA as the Public Key Encryption algorithm. 
4.3.2 Resource Exhaustion 
Another research question was to determine the point at which some resource on the 
system is exhausted and the system becomes unusable to SSL users.  This area also 
determines what, if any, performance differences in terms of maximum number of secure 
sockets are derived from using 128, 192, and 256 bit symmetric keys within the AES, 
DES3, and RC4 encryption algorithms.  Between the three different algorithms, AES was 
expected to perform significantly better.  This is due to the fact that it is one generation 
ahead of the other two algorithms, and was selected through open competition to become 
the new standard replacing DES [NIST01].  The increased size of the symmetric keys did 
impact performance, though with AES, not to a great degree with respect to maximum 
number of secure sockets (Table 7).  Even though 128-bit symmetric key encryption is 
widely acknowledged as being virtually impossible to break through brute force, 192 or 
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256 is better if there is not a significant reduction in speed.  This analysis implies that the 
best setup, with respect to getting the most secure sockets would be to use a heap size of 
256 MB, and the AES 256-bit symmetric key encryption.   
4.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the analysis and results of the research effort.  The 
simulation data was presented.  This data revealed the best possible setup of the given 
factors with regards to getting the maximum number of secure socket connections while 
still maintaining the highest level of security.  The data was explained to answer the 
investigative questions posed in Chapter 3.  
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5.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Research Overview 
The Java SSL/TLS package distributed with the J2SE 1.4.2 runtime is a Java 
implementation of the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocols.  Java-based web services and other 
systems deployed by the DoD will depend on this implementation to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.  Security and performance assessment of 
this implementation is critical given the proliferation of web services within DoD 
channels.   
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the research and talks to the significance of 
the effort.  The other sections of this chapter discuss the conclusions reached from the 
study, the significance of the research effort, recommendations for actions, and 
recommendations for future research. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
The research outcome centers around what steps should be taken to build a highly 
secure JSSE program while still allowing a maximum number of secure connections.  
Given the hardware constraints of this effort, it was determined that a server-side only 
authentication mechanism with a 1024-bit RSA asymmetric key would be used as a 
parameter to find the best combination of symmetric key size, symmetric key encryption 
algorithm, and JVM heap size for building a high performance, highly secure system. 
The best performance combination was a JVM heap size of 256 MB, the AES 
symmetric key encryption algorithm, and a symmetric key size of 256-bits.  Comparable 
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results were determined for heap sizes of 256 MB and 384 MB.  The main reason for 
staying with a 256 MB heap size was that it limits the impact on the physical memory of 
the server.  There was minimal value added since there was only an 8 percent increase 
between the two heap sizes in the maximum number of sockets that could be created by a 
server using the 256-bit AES encryption algorithm. 
5.3 Significance of Research 
This research is significant because it determines what parameters and factors to 
consider when developing a high-use Java JSSE server.  High-use is defined as being 
over 2000 simultaneous secure socket connections.  It also documented how to set up the 
application securely and provides source code that could be used as the security engine 
for a secure client/server application. 
5.4 Recommendations for Action 
It is recommended that before any development begins, a thorough investigation of 
the latest security issues associated with the development libraries should be determined.  
There were several security issues fixed from the Java J2SE 1.4 release to the J2SE 1.4.2 
release.  
The latest version of the development libraries should be used to the fullest extent 
possible.  Old applications written in previous releases should be reviewed to ensure they 
address all the latest vulnerabilities, and rewritten where necessary to utilize the security 
fixes implemented in the latest J2SE release.   
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Finally, based on the results of this effort, there is not a significant performance 
difference between 256-bit AES encryption and some of the more popular 128-bit 
symmetric encryption algorithms.  The 256-bit AES encryption mechanism does 
represent a significant increase in the ability to thwart brute force attacks.  It is suggested 
that organizations download the JCE Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy Files and 
use the 256-bit AES algorithm for the secure transmission of data. 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
This section is intended to capture all the correspondence and conversations with the 
National Security Agency (NSA) sponsor in defining exactly what this research was 
going to cover.  The following list of research extensions were of interest to the sponsor 
during the conduct of this investigation.  Before future work is attempted, coordination 
with the sponsor for elaboration of these topics is prudent. 
5.5.1 SSL standards compliance 
Topics: 
- Correct handling of SSL messages and roles. 
- Proper responses to invalid messages, including fail-secure behavior. 
- Error behavior including leakage of information in error messages. 
Tools and Techniques: 
- A good packet analyzer, like Ethereal 0.9.11. 
- Use a maliciously modified version of OpenSSL to do most of this testing.  
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5.5.2 SSL security configuration and lockdown 
Topics: 
- How are choices of cipher suites configured from code and in global configuration? 
- Are cipher suite choices enforced correctly on the client and on the server? 
- Server configuration of client authentication. 
- Access by application code to security information. 
- Degree to which application code can control SSL, including application code 
ability to configure SSL improperly. 
Tools and Techniques: 
- A good packet analyzer 
- An SSL debugging proxy might be good here 
- Mostly, this topic area will involve writing JSSE test code in Java, then sniffing 
traffic 
 
- Instrumented version of OpenSSL might be good 
This research effort covered a majority of this area.  However, there could be more 
focus put on specific items that can be derived from this area.  For instance, no testing 
was performed to create a misconfigured client that could possibly force a “secure” 
server to a more easily hacked symmetric key algorithm like DES 40-bit. 
5.5.3 PKI Security 
Topics: 
- Certificate management and trusted roots; how is integrity of cert storage protected, 
administered, and trusted. 
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- Ability to perform cert chain validation; RFC2459 and PKIX compliance, 
recognition and enforcement of X.509v3 certificate extensions, and use of CRLs, 
resistance to certificate chain spoofing. 
- Visibility of certificate operations to application code. 
- Date and validity interval handling. 
- Private key import capabilities and handling of PKCS#12 files. 
Tools and Techniques: 
- Mostly writing JSSE test code. 
- A good ASN.1/BER decoder, like dumpasn1. 
- A set of certificate chain test cases (e.g. from Santosh at U. of MD). 
- Ability to generate certificates and CRLs (probably OpenSSL is sufficient for this. 
5.5.4 JSSE/JCE randomization and key generation 
Topics: 
- Random Number Generation (RNG) operation and state exposure 
- RNG seeding, including JCE v. JSSE 
- RNG structure and reseeding 
Tools: 
- Some test code exercising JSSE crypto provider 
- Java debuggers 
- Java decompilers (This topic is likely to require some reverse-engineering of the 
Java code, because the source of the RNG is not available.) 
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5.5.5 Robustness of JSSE Implementation 
Topics: 
- Reaction to bad SSL packets. 
- Reaction to bad certificates. 
- Interoperability with other SSL implementations, especially at the 'edges' of the 
specification. 
 
- Susceptibility to timing attacks and other active cryptographic attacks (e.g. 
Bleichenbacher attack). 
- Susceptibility to resource exhaustion or other denial of service attacks. 
- Presence of information leaks (e.g. in padding, nonces, etc.). 
Tools: 
- Hacked SSL implementation (maybe OpenSSL). 
- Traffic generator (e.g. Hailstorm). 
- X.509 test case generator (NSA C4 can provide a simple one). 
This is another area that was partially covered by this thesis effort.  Bad SSL packets 
generated at the client were tested, but man-in-the-middle attacks were never performed 
in the simulations.  Timing attacks were addressed through research, not simulation and 
resource exhaustion limitations were found with given parameters and factors.  
Information leaks were lightly touched upon. 
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5.6 Summary 
The background chapter set up the research effort by giving detailed background on 
Java and how it’s evolved to become a secure architecture.  The SSL and JSSE 
implementations of it were explained.  The handshake and record protocol within SSL 
were mapped to show how the SSL process of encryption actually works.  JSSE class 
mappings and SSL interaction figures were shown and explained, as were security 
concerns associated with any SSL implementation.  
The methodology chapter stated the research problem and the goals of the research.  
This chapter also laid out the system and the services provided by the system.  
Performance metrics were defined and parameters and factors were identified.  The 
workload and its implementation were explained as were the details of how the factors 
and parameters were implemented in the simulation program.  
Chapter Four focused on the analysis and results of the experimentation.  The raw 
data obtained from the simulation scenarios was presented. The analysis of the data is 
explained and the answers are matched to the investigative questions of the research 
effort. 
This chapter discussed the conclusions of the research and talked to the 
significance of the effort.  The other sections of this chapter discussed the conclusions 
reached from the study, the significance of the research effort, recommendations for 
actions, and recommendations for future research. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A.1:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 64 MB (Part 1) 
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Figure A.2:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 64 MB (Part 2) 
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file   £dH   lables   flows   £ols   £0E   Analyze   firaph   Tflols   ^iew   Window   flelp 
Q G^ ki u P.   P- 
[i?**flf^^P>>+|EI^^O ^lhread4^ 
fe*t*t^^ 
100.0% maximum     730.00 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0%      median     729.00 
quartlla     729.00 
730.00 
730.00 
730.00 
quartlla     729.75 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0% minimum 
729.00 
729.00 
729.00 
729.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 729.25 
Std Dav 0.5 
Std Err Maan 0.25 
uppar95%Maan 730.04561 
lowar95%Maan 726.45439 
N 4 
Lu 
100.0% maximum     730.00 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0%      madlan     729.50 
quartlla     726.25 
730.00 
730.00 
730.00 
quartlla     730.00 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0% minimum 
726.00 
726.00 
726.00 
726.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 729.25 
Std Dav 0.9574271 
StdErrMaan 0.4767136 
uppar95%Maan 730.77346 
lowar95%Maan 727.72652 
N 4 
®dss3hG4d141B win 
745- 
744' 
743' 
742' 
741- 
^1 Ouantliss 
100.0% maximum     744.00 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0%      madlan     743.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
quartlla     743.75 
25.0%      quartlla 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0%      minimum 
742.25 
742.00 
742.00 
742.00 
742.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 743 
StdDav 0.6164966 
Std Err Maan 0.4062463 
uppar95%Maan 744.29923 
lowar95%Maan 741.70077 
N 4 
^1 Ouantliss 
100.0% maximum 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0% 
25.0%      quarlilt 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0%      minimum 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
quartlla     744.00 
madlan 743.50 
742.25 
742.00 
742.00 
742.00 
742.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 743.25 
Std Dav 0.9574271 
StdErrMaan 0.4767136 
uppar95%Maan 744.77346 
lowar95%Maan 741.72652 
N 4 
21 
A 
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Figure A.3:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 64 MB (Part 3) 
 
JMP - nhiead4 - DisliibulJon] 
file   £dH   lables   flows   £ols   £0E   Analyze   firaph   Tflols   ^iew   Window   flelp 
L^is-k^siShi^Al^Milfe^tfri.^^ 
[i?**flf^^P>>+|EI^^O ^lhread4^ 
100.0% maximum     746.00 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0%      median     745.50 
quartlla     744.25 
746.00 
746.00 
746.00 
quartlla     746.00 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0% minimum 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 745.25 
Std Dev 0.9574271 
StdErrMaan 0.4767136 
uppar95%Maan 746.77348 
lowar95%Maan 743.72652 
N 4 
Lu 
100.0% maximum 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0% 
50.0% 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0% 
quartlla 
madlan 
quartlla 
minimum 
736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
736.50 
734.25 
734.00 
734.00 
734.00 
734.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 
StdDav 
Std Err Maan 
uppar 95% Maan 
lowar 95% Maan 
N 
736.25 
2.0615526 
1.0307764 
739.53039 
732.96961 
4 
®rc4hG4d7GB win 
740' 
730' 
720' 
710' 
700' 
^[Ouantih 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0%      quartlla 
50.0% 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0%     minimum 
^1 Momsnts 
100.0% maximum     736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
737.25 
madlan 725.50 
quartlla 706.50 
706.00 
706.00 
706.00 
706.00 
Maan 723.75 
StdDav 15.326991 
Std Err Maan 7.6634957 
uppar95%Maan 746.13666 
lowar95%Maan 699.36134 
N 4 
^1 Ouantliss 
100.0% maximum     736.00 
99.5% 
97.5% 
90.0% 
75.0%      quartlla 
50.0% 
25.0% 
10.0% 
2.5% 
0.5% 
0.0%     minimum 
736.00 
736.00 
736.00 
737.75 
madlan 727.00 
quartlla 699.75 
694.00 
694.00 
694.00 
694.00 
^1 Momsnts 
Maan 721.5 
Std Dav 20.726402 
StdErrMaan 10.364201 
uppar95%Maan 754.46351 
lowar95%Maan 666.51649 
N 4 
21 
A 
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Figure A.4:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 96 MB (Part 1) 
 
1 ?^ ^MP - [ Ihiead4 - Disliibulmnl M -inix 
£ Ffe   Ecft   Tulles   Rom   Cak   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   Took   Vten   W^dow   He^ -Iflix 
llDi^[iB#EL=^^e    »-b^^*'l^|L^^x-t*»;fei,l^ *|^.^-©fe-H|fi,^^^ ^1^ 
[^?ia,<f ^ jr p p -\-  a—^o" |TJreaiH^                                 '1 
96 d ^ ®aes1] !8h9 Bd141B win 1-* ®aes1 8h9Gd76 S win 1^ ^ aes128h9Gd1 win 1^ - ae^5Gh 418_win          1 
11075- 
1105- A 
1110- 
11075- i 
1108- 
1107- 
1106- 
H 
1100- 
1098- 
1 
] ] ft 1 
11025- 1105- 1096- 
u 1105- 1 r 
1100- ,, 11025- W 1104- ] 
\ 
1094- - 1 y V 
10975- 
1 
1100- \l 1103- 1092- V 
▼j Quanliles 1 ▼] Quanliles 1 ▼] Quanliles ^ Quanliles 
100it% maxinjn     1105il                        100it% maxinjn     UOaO                        A00ff%> maxinjn 1107il                          100i»% maxinjn      1098il 
995%                           1105JI                             995%                           1108JI                             995% 1107JI                          995% 1098il 
975%                           1105JI                             975%                           1108JI                             975% 1107JI                          975% 1098il 
90i»%                           1105il                             90i»%                           1108il                             90i»% 1107JI                          90J»% 1098il 
75i»%       qiHlfe      1104^                             75i»%       qu»lfe      1106S                             JSOVy       qu»lfe 1107il                          75i»%       qiHlfe      1097.3 
50i»%      medai     1101 il                        50i»%      medai     11025                        50i»%      medai 11065                          50i»%        medai      10945 
25i»%       qiHlfe      llOOil                             25i»%       qu»lfe      1101^                             25i»%       qu»lfe 11045                          25i»%       qiHlfe      1094il 
10i»%                           llOOil                             10i»%                           llOlil                             10i»% 1104il                          10i»% 1094il 
25%                             1100JI                             25%                             1101 Jl                             25% 1104JI                          25% 1094il 
05%                             1100JI                             05%                             1101 Jl                             05% 1104JI                          05% 1094il 
OirXy      innHjn     llOOil OirXy      innHjn     llOlil Oit%      mniHjn 1104il 
1 
OirXy        innHjn      1094il 
1 ▼i Momenb ▼j Momenb ▼ Momenb ▼] Momenb 
hteoi                              1101.75                          hteoi                                11035                          hteoi 1106                       hteoi 109535 
SldDev                    2.3629078                          SldDev                    3.1091204                          SldDev 1.4142136                       SldDev 1.8929694 
SldBrhteoi           1.1814539                          SldBrhteoi           15545G32                          SldBrhteoi 0.7071068                       SldBrhteoi 03464847 
I4)pef 95% hteoi    11055099                          i^jpef 95% hteoi    1108.4473                          i^jpef 95% hteoi 1108.2503                       I4)pef 95% hteoi 1098.2621 
lDwef95%hteai    1097.9901                           lDwef95%hteai    10985527                          lDwef95%hteai 1103.7497                       lDwef95%hteai 10923379 
N                                                 4                          N                                                 4                          N 4                       N 4 
ri                                                                                                   1 2i ^r 1     1       y. 
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Figure A.5:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 96 MB (Part 2) 
 
?^ ^MP - [ Ihiead4 - Disliibulmnl 
£ Ffe   Ecft   Tulles   Rom   Cok   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   Took   Vten   W^dow   He^ -Ifllxl 
ll|Di^[iB#EL=^^e    »-b^^*'l^|L^^x-t*»;fei,l^l*l^.^.i r fe-H ifi,^ ^ ^' ffl 1^ 
|[4?ia,<f^^p^+      a— ^O"       Th«ad4^ 
®aes7%h9Gd7G8 
▼[ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1098il 
1098il 
1098il 
1098il 
1097JI 
1094il 
1094il 
1094il 
1094il 
1094il 
1094il 
Momenb 
hteoi 
SldDev 
SldBrhteoi 
1095 
2 
1 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 1098.1824 
lDwef95%hteai 1091.8176 
N 4 
®aes7^Gh9Gd1G 
▼[ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1098il 
1098il 
1098il 
1098il 
1098il 
1096il 
1091.8 
1091 il 
1091 il 
1091 il 
1091 il 
▼i Momenb 
hteoi 1095.25 
Sid Dev 3.4034296 
SldBrhteoi 1.7017148 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 1100£656 
lDwef95%hteai 1089.8344 
N 4 
erc4h96d1418 
A 
▼[ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1107 Jl 
1107 Jl 
1107 Jl 
1107 Jl 
1106.8 
11045 
11023 
1102 Jl 
1102 Jl 
1102 Jl 
1102 Jl 
▼i Momenb 
hteoi 11045 
SldDev 2.3804761 
SldBrhteoi 1.1902381 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 1108.2879 
lDwef95%hteai 1100.7121 
N 4 
1^ 3rc4li9Gd768 win 
^ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1111JI 
1111JI 
1111JI 
1111JI 
11105 
11075 
11053 
1105 Jl 
1105 Jl 
1105 Jl 
1105 Jl 
^ Momenb 
hteoi 1107.75 
Sid Dev 2.7537853 
SldBrMeoi 13768926 
I4)pef 95% Meoi 1112.1319 
lDwef95%Meai 11033E81 
N 4 
1^1   r j. 
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Figure A.6:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 96 MB (Part 3) 
 
r ?^JMP - f Ihiead4 - Disliibulioni HI 
^ Ffe   Ecft   Tulles   Rom   Cak   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   Took   Vten   W^dow   He^ »r,- 
lIlDi^^BaQL^^^^I 1 »■ b* '* H 1 ir i X- t* ::i h, fe^ ||*|^.^-©|fe-H|fi,^^^|ffl|^ 
in    ?*<f|^*^^+la"^Olll   |Th«ad4^                                 -1 
^ rc4li9Gd1G win ■'^ S des3li9Gd141S win ■'^ S des3li9Gd7G8 win ■'^ ^ des3li9Gd1G win                    1' 
1125- 850- 
1 
1122- 11225- 
* 
1100- 
■ - 
800- 1120- i A 
I 1120- 
1075- 750- 1118- 
r 
11 
11175- 
■ 1 
1050- 700- 1116- V 
1025- 
1 
650- 
= 
1114- 
V 
1115- 
y 
^1 Quanliies ▼] Quanliies ▼| Quanliies ▼| Quanliies 
100i»% maxinjn     llOQil                     100i»% maxinjn     OlOiU                     100i»% maxinjn     1120il                     100i»% maxinjn     1121il 
99.5%                           llOQil                          99.5%                           819in                         99.5%                           1120il                          99.5% 11213 
975%                           1108JI                          975%                           819JM                         975%                           1120JI                          975% 11213 
90i»%                           llOQil                          90i»%                           819in                         90i»%                           1120il                          90i»% 11213 
75i»%       qiHlfe      llOQil                          75i»%       qu»lfe      79450                         75i»%       qu»lfe      1119.3                          75i»%       qu»lfe      1120.8 
50i»%        medai      11075                          50i»%        medai      705in                         50i»%        medai      11165                          50i»%        medai      lllOil 
25i»%       qiHlfe      1053il                          25i»%       qu»lfe      G62m                         25i»%       qu»lfe      lllOil                          25i»%       qu»lfe      11165 
10i»%                           1035il                          10i»%                           653in                         10i»%                           lllOil                          10i»% 11163 
25%                             1035JI                          25%                             653JM                         25%                             1116JI                          25% 11163 
05%                             1035JI                          05%                             653JM                         05%                             1116JI                          05% 11163 
OirXy        innHjn      1035il 
- 
03%        innHjn      65330 
1 
03%        innHjn      11163 
- 
03%        innHjn      11163 
^1 Momenb ▼| Momenb ▼| Momenb ^1 Momenb 
hteoi                                10895                       hteoi                                  7205                      hteoi                              1117.25                       hteoi 1118.75 
SldDev                    36.336391                        SldDev                    71.299836                      SldDev                    1.8929694                       SldDev 22173558 
SldBrhteoi           18.168196                       SldBrhteoi           35.649918                      SldBrhteoi           03464847                       SldBrhteoi 1.1086779 
I4)pef 95% hteoi    1147.3193                       i^jpef 95% hteoi    83335395                      i^jpef 95% hteoi    1120.2621                        i^jpef 95% hteoi    1122.2783 
lDwef95%hteai    1031£807                       lDwef95%hteai    60734605                      lDwef95%hteai    1114.2379                       lDwef95%hteai    1115.2217 
N                                                 4                       N                                                 4                      N                                                 4                       N 4 
*l                                                                                                                                                  1 2l 
1 1       1         ^ 
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Figure A.7:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 256 MB (Part 1) 
 
?^JMP - rihiead4 - Disliibulioni 
^ Ffe   Ecft   lilies   Rom   Cak   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   TDDIS   Vew   W^dow   He^ 
llDi^gB#BL^^^e    •■b^^'^I^IL^^x-t^-ife.l^    *l^.^-©|fe'"»lfiib^^ 
ir^? ifr'fl^.^^^+ia^^oiii ptf^^ 3. 
S aes12Sli25Gd141S win ^ 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
JSOVy       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1608il 
1608il 
^GOSO 
^GOSO 
1604S 
15775 
1554JI 
1552JI 
1552JI 
1552JI 
1552JI 
▼ Momenb 
hteoi 1578.75 
SldDev 26.99S457 
SldBrhteoi 13.499228 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 1621.7106 
lDwef95%hteai 1535.7894 
N 4 
S aes12Sli25Gd768 win 
^ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
2409il 
2409il 
2409il 
2409il 
2404.8 
23865 
23285 
2311JI 
2311JI 
2311JI 
2311JI 
▼ Momenb 
hteoi 2373.25 
SldDev 43ffi8743 
SldBrhteoi 21534372 
intet 95% hteoi 2441.782 
lDwef95%hteai 2304.718 
N 4 
S aes12Sli25Gd1G win 
2975- 
2950- 
^925- 
2900- 
2875- 
i 
- 
1 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
2953 Jl 
2953 Jl 
2953 Jl 
2953 Jl 
29525 
29175 
2878 Jl 
2876 Jl 
2876 Jl 
2876 Jl 
2876 Jl 
▼{Mamenb 
hteoi 
SldDev 
SldBrMeoi 
I4)pef 95% Meoi 
lDwef95%Meai 
N 
2916 
41.705315 
20.852658 
2982.3625 
2849B375 
4 
®aes75Gli25Gd141S win 
I 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHHe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHHe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
1581 Jl 
1581 Jl 
1581 Jl 
1581 Jl 
15683 
15035 
1468il 
1465il 
1465il 
1465il 
1465il 
^ Momenb 
Meoi 
SldDev 
SldBrMeoi 
I4)pef 95% Meoi 
lDwef95%Meai 
N 
151335 
53368972 
26£34486 
1598^)128 
1428.4872 
4 
I    I    r 
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Figure A.8:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 256 MB (Part 2) 
 
?^JMP - rihiead4 - Disliibulioni 
^ Ffe   Ecft   lilies   Rom   Cak   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   TDDIS   Vew   W^dow   He^ 
llDi^gB#BL^^^e    •■b^^'^I^IL^^x-t^-ife.l^    *l^.^-©|fe'"»lfiib^^ 
ir^? ifr'fl^.^^^+ia^^oiii ptf^^ 3. 
S aes75Gli25Gd768 win ^ 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
JSOVy       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
2225 Jl 
2225 Jl 
2225 Jl 
2225 Jl 
722\Q 
21995 
2163JI 
2154JI 
2154JI 
2154JI 
2154JI 
▼ Momenb 
hteoi 21945 
SldDev 3055596 
SldBrhteoi 15.27798 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 2243.1214 
lDwef95%hteai 2145.8786 
N 4 
S aes75Gli25Gd1G win 
^ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
2942JI 
2942JI 
2942JI 
90i»% 2942il 
75i»%       qiHlfe      2941.8 
50i»%       medai      2937il 
25i»%       qiHlfe      2897.8 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Qftf,      mniHjn 
▼ Momenb 
hteoi 29255 
SldDev 26£3957 
SldBrhteoi 13.319785 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 2967.8895 
lDwef95%hteai 2883.1105 
N 4 
S rc4li25Gd141S win 
1925- 
J 
1875- 
■ 
1800- 
? 
1 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Qftf,      mniHjn 
1903il 
1903il 
1903il 
1903il 
1900.3 
1876JI 
1830il 
1820il 
1820il 
1820il 
1820il 
▼{Mamenb 
hteoi 
SldDev 
SldBrMeoi 
I4)pef 95% Meoi 
lDwef95%Meai 
N 
1868.75 
37368172 
18£34086 
1928J»52 
1809.448 
4 
^®rc4li25Gd7G8 win 
\ 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
75i»%       qiHHe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHHe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Qftf,      mniHjn 
2849il 
2849il 
2849il 
2849il 
2831 Jl 
2760 Jl 
2716B 
2708 Jl 
2708 Jl 
2708 Jl 
2708 Jl 
^ Momenb 
Meoi 
SldDev 
SldBrMeoi 
I4)pef 95% Meoi 
lDwef95%Meai 
N 
276935 
60.168513 
30B84257 
2864.9915 
26735085 
4 
I    I    r 
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Figure A.9:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 256 MB (Part 3) 
 
?^JMP - rihiead4 - Disliibulioni 
^ Ffe   Ecft   lilies   Rom   Cak   DOE   An^^ize   Gi^   TDDIS   Vew   W^dow   He^ 
n D 1^ BL ^^ ^e b^^'*|^|L^^X-t*;:;fe.|^    *l^.^-©lfe'"»lfiib^^ 
ir^? ifr'fl^.^^^+ia^^oiii ptf^^ 3. 
S rc4li25Gd1G win 
▼ Quanliles 
100it% maxiiHjn 
995% 
975% 
90i»% 
JSOVy       qiHlfe 
50i»%      medai 
25i»%       qiHlfe 
10i»% 
25% 
05% 
Oit%      mniHjn 
2968il 
2968il 
2968il 
2968il 
2966^ 
2937 Jl 
2881 il 
2881 il 
2881 il 
2881 il 
▼ Momenb 
hteoi 2930.75 
SMDev 41301739 
SldBrhteoi 20£0087 
I4)pef 95% hteoi 2996.3112 
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Figure A.10:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 384 MB (Part 1) 
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Figure A.11:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 384 MB (Part 2) 
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Figure A.12:  JMP Distribution Data for Heap Size of 384 MB (Part 3) 
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Appendix B 
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Figure B.1:  CPU Utilization for DES3, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 1418 Bytes 
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Figure B.2:  CPU Utilization for DES3, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 768 Bytes 
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Figure B.3:  CPU Utilization for DES3, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 16 Bytes 
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Figure B.4:  CPU Utilization for RC4, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 1418 Bytes 
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Figure B.5:  CPU Utilization for RC4, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 768 Bytes 
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Figure B.6:  CPU Utilization for RC4, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 16 Bytes 
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Figure B.7:  CPU Utilization for AES 256-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 1418 Bytes 
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Figure B.8:  CPU Utilization for AES 256-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 768 Bytes 
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Figure B.9:  CPU Utilization for AES 256-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 16 Bytes 
 
AES128h384d1418 Sockets/CPU %
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 1000 2000 3000
Sockets Created
C
PU
 % AES128h384d1418
Sockets/CPU %
 
Figure B.10:  CPU Utilization for AES 128-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 1418 Bytes 
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Figure B.11:  CPU Utilization for AES 128-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 768 Bytes 
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Figure B.12:  CPU Utilization for AES 128-bit, Heap 384 MB, and Data Size 16 Bytes 
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Appendix C 
KeyManagerFactory - This class acts as a factory for key managers based on a source of 
key material. Each key manager manages a specific type of key material for use by 
secure sockets. The key material is based on a KeyStore and/or provider specific 
sources [Sun03].  
KeyManagerFactory::getDefault()-Generates a KeyManagerFactory object that 
implements the specified key management algorithm [Sun03]. 
KeyManager- Base interface for JSSE key managers. These manage the key material 
which is used to authenticate to the peer of a secure socket [Sun03]. 
SecureRandom- This class provides a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) [Sun03a]. 
SSLContext- Instances of this class represent a secure socket protocol implementation 
which acts as a factory for secure socket factories. This class is initialized with an 
optional set of key and trust managers and source of secure random bytes [Sun03]. 
SSLContext::getInstance()-Generates a SSLContext object that implements the specified 
secure socket protocol [Sun03]. 
SSLServerSocketFactory- This class creates SSL server sockets [Sun03]. 
SSLServerSocket- This class extends ServerSockets and provides secure server sockets 
using protocols such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocols. Instances of this class are generally created using a 
SSLServerSocketFactory. The primary function of SSLServerSockets is to create 
SSLSockets by accepting connections. SSLServerSockets contain several pieces of 
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state data which are inherited by the SSLSocket at socket creation. These include the 
enabled cipher suites and protocols, whether client authentication is necessary, and 
whether created sockets should begin handshaking in client or server mode. The state 
inherited by the created SSLSocket can be overriden by calling the appropriate methods 
[Sun03]. 
SSLSession – Public Interface - In SSL, sessions are used to describe an ongoing 
relationship between two entities. Each SSL connection involves one session at a time, 
but that session may be used on many connections between those entities, 
simultaneously or sequentially. The session used on a connection may also be replaced 
by a different session. Sessions are created, or rejoined, as part of the SSL handshaking 
protocol. Sessions may be invalidated due to policies affecting security or resource 
usage. Session management policies are typically used to tune performance [Sun03]. 
SSLSocketFactory- Instances of this kind of socket factory return SSL sockets. An SSL 
implementation may be established as the "default" factory [Sun03]. 
SSLSocket- SSLSocket is a class extended by sockets which support the "Secure Sockets 
Layer" (SSL) or IETF "Transport Layer Security" (TLS) protocols. Such sockets are 
normal stream sockets (java.net.Socket), but they add a layer of security protections 
over the underlying network transport protocol, such as TCP [Sun03]. 
TrustManagerFactory- The javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory is an engine class 
for a provider-based service that acts as a factory for one or more types of 
TrustManager objects [Sun03]. 
TrustManagerFactory::getDefault()-Generates a TrustManagerFactory object that 
implements the specified trust management algorithm [Sun03]. 
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TrustManager- The primary responsibility of the TrustManager is to determine whether 
the presented authentication credentials should be trusted. If the credentials are not 
trusted, the connection will be terminated. To authenticate the remote identity of a 
secure socket peer, you need to initialize an SSLContext object with one or more 
TrustManagers. You need to pass one TrustManager for each authentication 
mechanism that is supported. If null is passed into the SSLContext initialization, a trust 
manager will be created for you. Typically, there is a single trust manager that supports 
authentication based on X.509 public key certificates [Sun03].
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